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Abstract 
 
What Can A Kansas Farmer Afford to Pay to Rent Cropland? 
 
 
Five years of continuous annual data are used to measure the marginal value product of 
cropland (return to land) on approximately 100 Kansas farms.  Determinants of the 
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What Can A Kansas Farmer Afford to Pay to Rent Cropland? 
 In 1999, Kansas Farmers paid $529 million of net rent to non-farm landlords (KS 
Dept. of Ag. and NASS).  For Kansas Farm Management Association farms in 1999, 
92% of the farms rented land (Langemeier and Delano, not dateda).  The 1997 U.S. 
Census indicated that 40% of U.S. farms rented or leased land and 41% of the land in 
farms was rented or leased.  For oilseed and grain farming, 55% of U.S. farms rented or 
leased land, and 52% of the land in farms was rented or leased.  Therefore, information 
about what farmers can afford to pay to rent cropland and procedures for estimating the 
value of land in individual farm operations is relevant for a large portion of U.S. farmers, 
especially those who produce major field crops.  Such information is also useful for 
landowners who wish to rent land to farmers, and to policy makers who are concerned 
about land resources and farm profitability.  
The purpose of this research was to investigate how much a farmer could afford to 
pay for rented cropland.  The three objectives were: (1) to measure the marginal value 
product (MVP) of cropland for a sample of Kansas farms, (2) to measure the annual 
variability of the MVP for cropland under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform Act of 1996, and (3) to examine the relationship between MVP of cropland and 




According to Ibendahl, Trimble, and Isaacs, recent drops in gross income from 
lower commodity prices have not lowered cash rental rates.  The authors explain that   3
future price expectations and machinery management concerns may be driving the 
unresponsive cash rental rates.  In our model, we include commodity price and a 
machinery quality variable to help explain what might be driving the MVP of cropland. 
  Rister et al. argue that the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 
1996 (FAIR) has substantially changed the way landowners of the Texas rice belt lease 
their cropland.  They concluded that higher rental rates are justified because of 
opportunity costs associated with leasing the cropland to a rice tenant, since landowners 
have the freedom to produce other crops under FAIR.  Higher rental rates sought by the 
landowner may lead to higher volatility within the observed rental rates.   
Burton and Abderrezak found expected farm profits to be positively related to 
increases in farm size and the amount of leased intermediate and long-term assets.  
Specifically, a large positive relationship exists between the degree of non-ownership of 
real estate and machinery, and expected farm profits.  This relationship indicates that a 
farm, which leases cropland and machinery at levels above average, would observe 
higher expected profits. 
  Garcia, Sonka, and Yoo, found no economic efficiency differences between 
moderate (< 700 acres) and large farm (> 700 acres) sizes.  In contrast, Nivens and 
Kastens found increased profits associated with increasing farm size.  Coinciding with 
Burton and Abderrezak, Garcia, Sonka, and Yoo also concluded that increased short run 
profitability resulted as the number of acres rented increases.  This research will examine 
the impact on the MVP of cropland caused by several independent variables including 
farm size, and the percent of acres rented. 
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Procedures and Data 
 
Measuring the MVP of Cropland 
Farm enterprise data are extremely scarce.  A strong point of this research was the 
use of actual farm enterprise data from the Kansas Management, Analysis and Research 
in 105 counties (K-MAR-105) data set.  We focused on the eighteen counties that 
comprise the North Central Kansas Farm Management Association.  The data consisted 
of the financial records 103 farms that met the standards for inclusion in the enterprise 
Profit-Link Analyses (an annual publication from Kansas State University Research and 
Extension) each year from 1995 to 1999.   
  What farmers can afford to pay for rented cropland, is measured for individual 
farms at the margin by calculating the MVP as a weighted average of returns to land for 
the annual mix of five major crops (wheat, milo, corn, soybeans, and alfalfa).  Returns to 
land are defined as gross crop revenue less total variable costs and all fixed costs except 
land.  Gross crop revenue includes crop sales, government payments, and crop insurance 
indemnity payments.  The MVP for the farm was calculated using the MVP of each crop 
weighted by the acres of the crop divided by the total acres of the five major crops.    
Because the K-MAR-105 data include only the operator’s share of income and 
expenses, the data were adjusted to include the landlord’s share for gross income, 
fertilizer expense, herbicide/insecticide expense, conservation expense, and seed expense.  
Thus each farm was treated as though the operator owned it.  Procedures for calculating 
the MVP of cropland follow.     
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Addition of the Landlord’s Share to K-MAR-105 Enterprise Revenue Data 
First, the percent of production that represents the landlord’s share must be 
computed and added into the operator’s share of production.  Equation 1 represents the 
operator’s percentage of total crop production, including both owned and rented 
production (Farm percent).  Thus, the landlord’s share of total farm production is equal to 
(1- Farm percent). 
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production crop s operator'
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In this formula, operator’s crop production represents the amount of the crop kept by the 
producer for both rented and owned acres, total (operator’s plus landlord’s) rented 
production is the total production on rented acres, and owned production is the total 
(operator) production on owned acres. 
 To account for the landlord’s gross income on crop share rented acres, Equation 










percent Farm             
income crop gross s Operator'
Income Gross
     
Operator’s gross crop income is the total dollar value earned by the operator on rented 
and owned crop acres in a given year, and farm percent is explained above.  This 
procedure was also used to make adjustments for the expected landlord’s share of 
government payments and crop insurance income. 
 
Addition of the Landlord’s Share to K-MAR-105 Enterprise Expense Data 
K-MAR-105 enterprise costs data do not include the landlord’s share of any 
shared expenses.  The landlord’s share of expenses was added to the operator’s costs   6
using calculated percentages of the landlord’s share from a recent survey of crop 
producers in North Central Kansas (Tsoodle and Wilson).  Tsoodle and Wilson report 
percentages for three separate crop sharing arrangements, as well as the average expense 
percentages paid by the landlord under each crop share arrangement.  The landlord’s 
shares of expenses (fertilizer, herbicide/insecticide, seed, and conservation) were derived 
for wheat, milo, soybeans, corn, and alfalfa.  The expected landlord’s share of an expense 
is equal to the summed percent of expense paid by the landlord multiplied by the crop 
share arrangement percentage.    
 Since adequate data to distinguish between chemical and application costs were 
not available, we assumed the application costs would be included in the total bill to the 
operator and were included in the adjustment for chemical costs.  If the operators apply 
their own chemicals, then the application costs will be reported under machinery 
expenses.  The same procedure was used for fertilizer and fertilizer application.  The 
landlord’s share was added to the reported fertilizer, herbicides/insecticides, seed, and 
conservation expenses.  Additionally, because data to separate herbicide and insecticide 
were not available within the KMAR data set, herbicide percentages from Tsoodle and 
Wilson were used in landlord’s expense share calculations for all crops except alfalfa.  
For alfalfa, the insecticide percentage from Tsoodle and Wilson was used to calculate the 
landlord’s share of expense.  Equation 3 was used to add the landlord’s share of the 
different costs to the operator’s share to arrive at the total costs per acre. 
 
(3)   
( )
exp. prod. oper.
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exp. of share s landlord'





























=      7
Operator’s production expense is equal to the amount the producer paid for a given 
expense for a certain crop for rented and owned crop acres in a given year, and farm 
percent and landlord’s share of crop are as previously defined.  
 
Calculation of Interest on Variable Expenses 
Variable production expense included the costs of hired labor, machinery repairs, 
seed, fertilizer, machinery hired, fees, fuel, storage, personal property tax, farm utilities, 
herbicide/insecticide, conservation, farm auto, and crop insurance.  Interest on variable 
costs was computed by multiplying three-fourths of the sum of the variable costs by an 
interest rate of 8% (Langemeier and DeLano, not datedb). 
 
Fixed Costs 
  The fixed costs that were included to compute returns to land were: 1) 
management charge, 2) machinery depreciation, 3) farm insurance (not including crop 
insurance), 4) unpaid operator labor, and 5) a calculated interest charge.  The 
management charge per acre is defined as four percent times the gross farm income per 
acre from the five crops.   
Depreciation reported in the K-MAR-105 data series is market depreciation as 
opposed to a tax depreciation, and should be representative of the cost of farming.  It is 
primarily depreciation on machinery.  Depreciation on buildings is included, but the 
value is small enough to be insignificant.     8
The interest charge represents an opportunity charge on farm machinery.  
Machinery value for each crop is equal to machinery depreciation multiplied by ten.  The 
interest charge calculation is as follows for a given farm in a given year for all five crops:   
(4)  Interest charge/acre = 8% * Machinery value/ Total crop acres   
where machinery value is the sum of the total value for each of the five crops. 
Unpaid operator labor represents the value of unpaid labor on the farm.  This 
value is directly reported in the KMAR data set within the fixed costs category.   
 
Marginal Value Product Calculation 
  The marginal value product (MVP) of cropland is a weighted average of the 
different crops planted each year.  The marginal value product equals the sum of each 
enterprise's net income multiplied by the acres of each respective crop divided by the 
total number of acres for the entire farm.  The MVP formula is as follows for a given 





jt Acres   Crop   Total
acres   crop * income Net
MVP
￿
=      
where i represents crop (alfalfa, corn, milo, wheat, soybeans), j represents farm, and t 
represents year (1995-1999).  
 
Regression Analysis 
This section discusses data processing to produce independent variables and the 
two models that were used in the regression analysis. 
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Data Handling to Produce Independent Variables 
Depreciation, machinery repairs, hired labor, unpaid operator labor, crop income 
(revenue), and crop production were all converted to per acre values.  After those 
conversions, several additional variables were created for use in the regression analysis.  
The first variable created was Labor.  This variable is the sum of unpaid operator labor 
per acre and hired labor per acre.  Output price per unit (Price) was the next variable to be 
created, and is computed as crop income divided by crop production.  Since both are on a 
per acre basis, the result would be a $/unit of production.  Mach1 was created to measure 
machine quality and is calculated as the ratio of machinery depreciation-to-machinery 
repairs.  The machinery depreciation-to-labor ratio is represented by Mach2.  
The variable Rentpct represents the percent of all crop acres that were rented by a 
farm in a given year.   The variable Rentpct2 is equal to percent of acres rented squared.  
This variable is included to allow the impact of renting land, if there is one, to be 
nonlinear.  Finally, a year dummy variable was created for 1995 through 1999, with 1999 
serving as the default year.  All variables are computed for each farm in each year for all 
five crops individually.  Total crop acres (TCA) represents the sum of all five crops for a 
given farm in a given year.  The variable TCA2 is equal to total crop acres squared.  
These variables are included to determine the impact farm size has on the returns to land.   
 
Normalized Data 
  When necessary, independent variables are normalized to allow for cross crop 
comparisons.  With data normalization, it is possible to compare an acre of wheat with an 
acre of milo in terms of relative productivity.  Because both are computed relative to their   10
means, the comparison of which crop is producing more is relative to the average.  
Machinery depreciation, machinery repairs, total labor, crop production, machinery hired, 
output price, machinery depreciation-to-labor ratio, and machinery depreciation-to-
machinery repairs ratio were normalized.  They were normalized as a percent difference 
from the average according to  























=      
 where Yijt is the observed value for a specific farm for a specific crop in a given year, 
it Y represents the average value for all farms for the same crop in the same year, and 2it is 
the normalized value for the variable y of the i
th enterprise in year t. 
 
Relative Variable Indexes 
Using the normalized values computed in Equation 6 and the percent of each 
farm’s total enterprise acres that were used in the production of a specific crop, relative 
variable indexes were computed for crop yield (Yield), machinery depreciation (Deprec), 
machinery repairs (repair), machinery depreciation-to-machinery repairs ratio (Mach1), 
machinery depreciation-to-labor ratio (Mach2), machinery hired (Machir), and the sum of 
unpaid and hired labor (Labor).  The normalized values were weighted by their respective 
crop’s percent of total farm acres and then summed to compute the index value.  For 
example, the relative yield index is equal to the normalized alfalfa production times 
percent of acres in alfalfa (ALFpct) plus normalized soybean production times percent of 
acres in soybeans (SOYpct) plus the normalized wheat production times percent of acres 
in wheat (WHTpct) plus the normalized milo production times percent of acres in milo   11
(MILpct) plus the normalized value of corn production times percent of acres in corn 
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where i represents one of the five crops (alfalfa, corn, milo, wheat, soybeans), j represents 
an individual farm, t represents a year (1995-1999), and A represents the percent of acres 
in a crop on a farm in a year.  
 
Diversification 
A Herfindahl type index was used as an indication of crop diversity for each farm.  
The index is computed as 
2
i S H S = , where Si is equal to one enterprise’s share of the 
total crop mix, and in this application is computed by summing the squared value of the 
ALFpct, SOYpct, WHTpct, MILpct, and CRNpct variables (Tirole).  The variable DIV 
represents the index value within the regression.  A value of one indicates complete 
specialization, or no diversification.   
 
Conceptual Model 
  For this research we assume that each producer is a rational, profit-maximizing 
producer.  Our producer believes that the amount he or she could pay for an additional 
acre of rented cropland is determined by factors such as farm size, average crop yield, 
diversification, quality of machinery, machinery usage relative to labor usage, crop prices 
received, crop rotations, and management ability.   
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Regression Model I  
In model I, all independent variables are included in the model individually,  
(8)    
CRNpct â MILpct â   SOYpct â
ALFpct â y98 â y97 â y96 â y95 â Machir â
Rentpct â Rentpct â Labor â Price â Repair â
Deprec â Div â Yield â TCA â TCA â â
19 18 17
16 15 14 13 12 11
2





+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + + = MVP
       
The following signs on independent variables were hypothesized.  Total crop 
acres are expected to be positive, assuming economies of scale exist.  Total crop acres 
squared is expected to be negative, indicating diminishing returns to an increase in total 
crop acres.  Crop yield is expected to be positive.  Because higher levels of the 
diversification variable Div indicate higher levels of specialization, Div is expected to be 
positive.  Higher levels of specialization are expected to result in higher profitability.  
The signs for machinery depreciation, machinery repairs, and labor are difficult to 
forecast.  To the extent that a producer can “trade-off” these variables, they cannot be 
signed a priori.  A producer who is not mechanically inclined may manage his or her 
farm with higher machinery depreciation but lower machinery repairs and labor.  On the 
other hand, a mechanically inclined producer may manage his or her farm with low 
machinery depreciation, and higher machinery repairs and labor.  Thus, these variables 
may or may not influence the MVP of cropland.  Crop (output) price is expected to be 
positive.  A higher price relative to the average indicates higher revenues, and an 
increased ability to pay more for rented cropland.   We have no sign expectation on 
percent of rented acres.   Percent of rented acres squared is included to allow the impact 
of renting land, if there is one, to be nonlinear.  The sign on machinery hired is expected 
to be negative or positive.  Returning to the “trade-off” argument, a producer may trade-  13
off between hiring machinery and owning machinery.  Since the percent of acres planted 
to wheat is the default variable, the signs on all of the crop percent variables will be 
determined by how profitable they are relative to wheat.  All variable descriptions are 
given in Table 1. 
 
Regression Model II 
In model II, two ratios were used in place of machinery repairs, machinery 
depreciation, and labor.  The first ratio, machinery depreciation divided by machinery 
repairs, was included to measure machinery quality.  The second ratio, machinery 
depreciation divided by the sum of unpaid and hired labor was included to measure the 
capitol-to-labor ratio.  Model II is shown in Equation 9.   
(9) 
CRNpct â MILpct â   SOYpct â
ALFpct â y98 â y97 â y96 â y95 â Machir â
Rentpct â Rentpct â or Deprec/Lab â Price â
air Deprec/Rep â Div â Yield â TCA â TCA â â
18 17 16
15 14 13 12 11 10
2





+ + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + + = MVP
   
Hypothesized signs are the same for variables included in both models.  We have 
no sign expectations on the ratios of machinery depreciation to machinery repairs and 
machinery depreciation to labor.  As stated previously, producers who employ different 
management strategies could “trade-off” between these variables.  Thus, these variables 
may or may not influence the MVP of cropland. 
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Results 
MVP of Cropland  
  Table 2 reports the MVP summary statistics by crop and year.  From 1995 to 1999, 
the average whole farm MVP of cropland ranged from a low of $57.31 in 1998 to a high 
of $115.70 in 1996.  During this same time the annual whole farm standard deviation 
ranged from $30.22 to $43.53.  The coefficient of variation ranged from a low of 35.3% 
(1997) to a high of 65.8% (1998) indicating considerable variability from year to year 
relative to the mean.  For the entire five-year period, the average whole farm MVP of 
cropland was $76.99 an acre, with a standard deviation of  $43.27 an acre.  Nine of the 
eleven counties in the North Central Crop Reporting District (NCCRD) are also in the 
North Central Farm Management Association.   So NCCRD cash rental rates may 
provide a perspective on the MVP of cropland.  According to the Kansas Agriculture 
Statistics Service (KASS), the average cash rental rates for the NCCRD from 1995 to 
1999 was $37.70 an acre.  This is substantially lower than our reported MVP mean of 
$76.99 an acre.  The average reported by KASS is only representative of cash rents paid, 
where our average represents all types of leases that affected the data set.  Also, the actual 
value paid is not always representative of the actual dollar amount that could be paid for 
an additional acre of rented cropland, at least not in the short run.   
  The computed whole-farm MVPs of cropland values are quite variable.  Likely, 
this variability is due to weather variability as well as general market conditions.  
However, given the large variability that occurs within a given year, it is also indicative 
of highly variable management abilities across producers.  Another possible cause of the   15
large range is varying land qualities.  Land quality is not accounted for in the K-MAR-
105 data set. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Ordinary least squares regression is used to examine the relationship between 
MVP of cropland and farm characteristics such as farm size, machinery management, and 
diversity and/or specialization.  Summary statistics of all variables included in Models I 
and II are reported in Table 3. 
                         
Regression Model I  
Of the nineteen variables, thirteen were statistically significant at the 5% level 
(Table 4).  The independent variables explained 72% of the variability in the dependant 
variable (i.e., R
2= 0.72).  The root mean square error is $23.39/acre.   
The signs were not as expected on total crop acres and total crop acres squared.  
The sign on the TCA variable is negative and TCA
2 is positive indicating that MVP 
decreases at a decreasing rate for most of our data’s range.  Once farm size reaches 1882 
acres, MVP increases as farm size increases. 
The crop mix variables suggest that MVP increased by $0.59, $0.52, and $0.43 
per acre by increasing acres of corn, soybeans, and alfalfa, respectively, 1% relative to 
wheat acres.  Percent of acres planted to milo was not statistically significant.  Based on 
the above stated results, relative to wheat, corn production was the most profitable crop in 
North Central Kansas during 1995-1999.  Soybeans and alfalfa follow corn.     
With regard to the indexed variables, the interpretations are as follows.  The 
average of the indexes should be zero, so interpretation would be from the average.  If the   16
yield index variable increases by one percent above the average, then the MVP of 
cropland will increase by $1.30 an acre.  In other words, those producers that had yields 
1% higher than average, ceteris paribus, could pay $1.30 more per acre to rent cropland.  
A decrease of $0.11, $0.22, and $0.15 per acre in the MVP of cropland will be observed, 
if machinery depreciation, machinery repairs, and labor, respectively, are 1% above 
average.  When the output prices are 1% above average, the MVP of cropland increases 
by $1.13 an acre.  If machinery hired is 1% above average, then the MVP of cropland 
will decrease by $0.02 an acre.  The percent of rented land, the percent of rented land 
squared, and the diversification variables are not significantly different from zero. 
  Only years 1996 and 1997 were statistically different from zero.  Years 1995 and 
1998 are no different than the default year of 1999.  Producing in 1996 relative to 1999 
would increase the MVP of cropland by $57.13 an acre, and producing in 1997 relative to 
1999 would yield an increase in the MVP of cropland of $24.86 an acre.  Both of these 
results indicate much higher revenues per acre for farms in 1996 and 1997 relative to 
1999.  This could be due to high corn and soybean prices in those years, along with high 
government payments and high yields.   
 
Regression Model II 
Only six of the eighteen variables were statistically significant at the 5% level 
(Table 5).  The R
2 value of 0.58 indicates a weaker goodness of fit (in-sample) than 
Model I.  The root mean square error of Model II is $28.03/acre, which also suggests a 
worse in-sample predictive ability relative to Model I.  Significance of Yield and Price in 
Model II confirm their importance in determining the MVP of cropland.  Significance of   17
y96 and y97 confirm that 1996 and 1997 were significantly more profitable than other 
years.  Lack of significance of Mach1 (machinery depreciation divided by machinery 
repairs) suggests that farm profitability may be achieved with both costly new machinery 
and low repair costs, or less costly machinery and high repair costs.  Significance and the 
negative regression coefficient of Mach2 (machinery depreciation divided by the sum of 
unpaid and hired labor) indicates that substitution of machinery for labor is not profitable.  
An F-test was conducted to compare the two models.  The calculated F-statistic was 
245.02, which is greater than the critical value (5% level) of 3.84, so we reject the null 
hypothesis of the models being equivalent, Model I is the better model. 
 
Summary 
The MVP of cropland was measured for 103 farms located in North Central 
Kansas from 1995 to 1999, and proved to be highly variable.  All of the observations 
occurred under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR).  
Clearly profitability is highly variable under FAIR, further research is needed to 
determine whether profitability under FAIR is more or less variable than profitability 
under previous farm programs.  It is believed that the majority of the variability resulted 
from differing levels of management ability and weather changes.  A model that 
considered machinery depreciation, machinery repairs, and labor was better than a model 
that expressed the machinery and labor variables as ratios.  The independent variables 
explained 72% of the variability in the MVP of cropland.  Significant variables included 
total crop acres, total crop acres squared, percent of acres planted to alfalfa, percent of 
acres planted to soybeans, percent of acres planted to corn, crop yield, machinery   18
depreciation, machinery repairs, total labor, commodity price, machinery hired, year 
1996, and year 1997.  A notable observation is the signs on the total crop acres (TCA) 
and total crop acres squared (TCA
2) variables.  The sign was negative for TCA and 
positive for TCA
2, which is the opposite of our hypothesis.  However for farms over 1882 
acres, MVP increased as farm size increases.  A second model considered machinery 
depreciation divided by machinery repairs and machinery depreciation divided by total 
labor.  The first model did a significantly better job of explaining the MVP of cropland.  
However, the second model confirmed that 1996 and 1997 were the most profitable years 
and that commodity price and crop yields significantly affect the MVP of cropland.  It 
also indicated that substitution of machinery for labor would decrease the MVP of 
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable  Name  Units 
TCA  Total crop acres  Acres 
TCA2  Total crop acres squared  Acres 
ALFpct  Percent of total acres planted in alfalfa
a  % 
SOYpct  Percent of total acres planted in soybeans  % 
MILpct  Percent of total acres planted in milo  % 
CRNpct  Percent of total acres planted in corn  % 
Yield  Crop production  Indexed value with mean 0 
Deprec  Machinery depreciation  Indexed value with mean 0 
Mach1  Machinery depreciation to machinery 
repairs ratio 
Indexed value with mean 0 
Mach2  Machinery depreciation to labor ratio  Indexed value with mean 0 
Repair  Machinery repairs  Indexed value with mean 0 
Labor  Sum of unpaid and hired labor  Indexed value with mean 0 
Price  Output (crop) price  Indexed value with mean 0 
Machir  Machinery hired  Indexed value with mean 0 
Rentpct  Percent of total acres rented   % 
Rentpct2  Percent of total acres rented squared  % 
Div  Diversification 
Indexed value ranging to 1, 
where one is complete 
specialization 
y95  Dummy variable for 1995
b  0 or 1 
y96  Dummy variable for 1996  0 or 1 
y97  Dummy variable for 1997  0 or 1 
y98  Dummy variable for 1998  0 or 1 
aPercent of total acres planted to wheat was not included so the percentages did not sum to 100. 
bThe default year was 1999. 
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Table 2. The Marginal Value Product of Cropland 
  # of Obs  Average  Minimum  Maximum  Standard Deviation 
1995           
Alfalfa  54  $85.87   ($71.40)  $400.79   $91.67  
Soybeans  41  $74.41   ($75.23)  $207.85   $57.57  
Wheat  96  $36.99   ($28.95)  $125.96   $33.66  
Milo  88  $102.50   ($120.11)  $269.40   $63.83  
Corn  10  $81.58   ($54.35)  $192.73   $86.59  
Whole Farm  289  $63.45   ($13.84)  $178.00   $34.78  
1996           
Alfalfa  47  $137.31   $574.91   ($63.08)  $104.26  
Soybeans  45  $161.74   $312.57   ($1.35)  $67.75  
Wheat  94  $110.37   $288.58   ($35.96)  $53.76  
Milo  96  $105.50   $273.38   ($4.61)  $51.06  
Corn  15  $146.09   $366.32   ($68.76)  $106.07  
Whole Farm  297  $115.70   $23.75   $226.48   $43.53  
1997           
Alfalfa  53  $132.95   ($24.40)  $366.82   $89.20  
Soybeans  49  $109.83   ($54.45)  $235.60   $64.52  
Wheat  93  $85.81   ($58.78)  $156.86   $35.00  
Milo  97  $59.33   ($89.90)  $167.91   $42.53  
Corn  15  $45.63   ($46.65)  $147.22   $51.47  
Whole Farm  307  $85.72   $12.59   $163.29   $30.22  
1998           
Alfalfa  58  $127.05   ($104.80)  $328.82   $90.16  
Soybeans  54  $61.23   ($139.70)  $157.81   $62.64  
Wheat  92  $56.89   ($99.32)  $166.13   $38.23  
Milo  94  $34.56   ($187.92)  $141.90   $49.87  
Corn  20  $52.45   ($132.26)  $148.51   $68.55  
Whole Farm  318  $57.31   ($45.42)  $161.44   $37.69  
1999           
Alfalfa  59  $112.59   ($33.55)  $319.26   $71.26  
Soybeans  65  $76.29   ($71.37)  $190.00   $49.29  
Wheat  95  $61.64   ($69.06)  $183.69   $40.58  
Milo  88  $37.19   ($112.01)  $149.99   $46.64  
Corn  21  $28.95   ($40.41)  $117.05   $50.77  
Whole Farm  328  $62.78   ($66.04)  $183.69   $40.34  
1995-1999           
Alfalfa  271  $118.63   ($104.80)  $574.91   $90.44  
Soybeans  251  $94.39   ($139.70)  $312.57   $69.17  
Wheat  499  $70.33   ($99.32)  $288.58   $48.00  
Milo  460  $67.87   ($187.92)  $273.38   $59.43  
Corn  80  $66.03   ($132.26)  $366.32   $82.18  
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Table 3: Variable Summary Statistics 
Variable            N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
MVP  515   76.99  43.2729  -66.04  226.48 
TCA  515  816.23  460.9935  72.9  2639.60 
TCA2  515  878335.80  1049238  5314.41  6967488 
ALFpct  515   6.54  11.5563  0  85.27 
SOYpct  515   7.92  10.7797  0  53.84 
WHTpct  515  57.53  20.6691  0  100 
MILpct  515  26.07  14.6852  0  100 
CRNpct  515   1.93  6.1372  0  41.72 
Yield  515   0.03  22.2380  -72.63  64.47 
Deprec  515  28.04  94.5833  -99.51  770.10 
Repair  515  -0.58  48.1239  -93.95  304.82 
Mach1  515   0.83  135.5978  -99.24  1665.58 
Mach2  515  -2.04  78.2365  -99.61  461.02 
Labor  515   0.80  48.4856  -85.29  283.83 
Price  515  -0.09  17.7728  -32.97  90.48 
Machir  515  -2.38  160.3951  -100  1022.12 
Rentpct  515  69.27  26.8871  0  100 
Rentpct2  515  5520.15  3258.74  0  10000 
Div  515   0.50  0.1676  0.22  1 
y95  515   0.20  0.4003  0  1 
y96  515   0.20  0.4003  0  1 
y97  515   0.20  0.4003  0  1 
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Table 4. Results of Regression Model I 
Variable       Parameter Estimates  Stand error  t-value  p-value 
Intercept  64.69  11.13   5.82  0.0001 
TCA  -0.04   0.01  -5.26  0.0001 
TCA2   0.00   0.00   3.41  0.0007 
ALFpct   0.43   0.11   3.80  0.0002 
SOYpct   0.52   0.13   4.04  0.0001 
MILpct  -0.05   0.09  -0.54  0.5872 
CRNpct   0.59   0.21   2.75  0.0062 
Yield   1.30   0.06  23.23  0.0001 
Deprec  -0.11   0.01  -8.12  0.0001 
Repair  -0.22   0.02  -9.78  0.0001 
Labor  -0.15   0.03  -5.71  0.0001 
Price   1.12   0.07  15.33  0.0001 
Machir  -0.02   0.01  -3.69  0.0002 
Rentpct   0.23   0.17   1.36  0.1743 
Rentpct2  -0.00   0.00  -0.68  0.4960 
Div  13.80  10.18   1.36  0.1756 
y95   2.66   3.32   0.80  0.4242 
y96  57.13   3.33  17.14  0.0001 
y97  24.86   3.30   7.53  0.0001 







   25
 Table 5. Results of Regression Model II 
Variable  Parameter Estimates  Stand error  t-value  p-value 
Intercept  53.80  13.17   4.08  0.0001 
TCA  -0.02   0.01  -1.62  0.1054 
TCA2   0.00   0.00   0.80  0.4266 
ALFpct   0.08   0.13   0.56  0.5725 
SOYpct   0.48   0.15   3.12   0.0019* 
MILpct  -0.05   0.11  -0.43  0.6675 
CRNpct  -0.13   0.23  -0.55  0.5819 
Yield   1.18   0.07  17.86   0.0001* 
Mach1  -0.00   0.01  -0.14  0.8897 
Mach2  -0.04   0.02  -2.00  0.0462 
Price   1.24   0.09  14.12   0.0001* 
Machir  -0.01   0.01  -1.17  0.2421 
Rentpct   0.14   0.21    0.65  0.5132 
Rentpct2  -0.00   0.00  -0.36  0.7162 
Div  15.58  12.19   1.28  0.2020 
y95   2.24   3.97   0.56  0.5736 
y96  57.07   3.99  14.30   0.0001* 
y97  25.39   3.95   6.42   0.0001* 
y98  -2.55   3.93  -0.65  0.5170 
*This variable was significant in both models. 
 